Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict - Update

By Donald Hill and Tom Cooper

Armenia and Azerbaijan had been fighting since 1988, with Armenia relying on Russian support and viewing Turkey as a threat. Following years of disagreements with the government in Baku, Turkey has been fully backing Azerbaijan since around 2019. Flushed with money thanks to extensive oil revenues, over the last decade Azerbaijan was able to build an army strong enough to dominate Armenia in 2023 and fully recover the region of Nagorno-Karabakh - claimed by and occupied by Armenia in the early 1990s. Russia did not provide any aid or support to Armenia.

In September 2023, immediately after seizing full control over Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan publicly talked about creating a corridor to Nakhchivan, an Azeri-populated enclave that is cut off by Armenian territory. Talks about creating such a corridor through Armenia are going on for years. However, since the wars of 2020 and 2023, Azerbaijan is in such a superior position vis-a-vis Armenia that the government in Yerevan must negotiate seriously.

Certainly enough, Armenia insisted on full control of such a corridor, and this to be subjected to its own customs and security. Explaining its mistrust with past experiences with Armenia, Azerbaijan announced it does not want to invest in roads and railroads when any possible new government in Yerevan could bring a change of policy. Instead, Baku demanded a third party to intermediate and to guarantee any agreements.

Turkey agreed to do so. As a result of related negotiations, an agreement was reached to establish the Zangezur corridor on the southern edge of Armenia, along its border with Iran.

The Zangezur Corridor would increase Turkey’s trade with Azerbaijan and the entire region.

Officially at least, Turkey and Armenia still do not have formal diplomatic relations - because Turkey wants Armenia to agree to a peace treaty with Azerbaijan. Before that happens, Azerbaijan wants Armenia to change its constitution’s claim to Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia’s government - which refused to do so earlier (indeed: its refusals have provoked both wars of 2020 and 2023) - is nowadays willing to do so. However, it explains that this would require a referendum which could take two years to organise and apply. Turkey and Azerbaijan declared themselves willing to wait while keeping the pressure on Armenia.

Presently, it is easy for the two countries to maintain the pressure. Armenia is not only economically unable to rebuild its battered armed forces, but was also left down by its primary ally, Putin’s government in Moscow. Armenians not only bitterly regret relying on the Russians, but even the days of the Russian military base in Armenia (garrisoned by up to 3,000 troops), appear to be numbered. Unsurprisingly, the parliament in Yerevan already passed a bill that allows the nationalization of an electric company owned by Russians. Moreover, Russia has not been part of any of latest negotiations.

For its part, Azerbaijan arrested seven people connected to a Russian media outlet, there is anger over two ethnic Azerbaijanis that died in Russian custody, and outrage about the 38 passengers that died when an Azerbaijani passenger jet was hit by Russian anti-aircraft fire, forcing it to crash land last December. Azerbaijan’s president declined to attend Russia’s Victory Day parade in the same month that Ukraine’s foreign minister visited Azerbaijan. The presidents of Ukraine and Azerbaijan also talked on the phone. A member of parliament called for a (NATO) Turkish base to be established for protection from Russia and Iran but the president dismissed that option six months ago.

The Zangezur Corridor would support the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route between China and Europe, which bypasses the Northern Route through Russia. In 2022, the Trans-Caspian route’s cargo doubled to 1.5 million tons while the Northern route declined by 34%.

Russia’s influence continues to decline since it invaded Ukraine.