Well, there’s not much to say, you’ve outlined an over-arching issue then filled in the dots for us beautifully, confirmed some sad suspicions that many have been lost or injured through disorganisation, rather than inevitable losses to enemy action.
It's becoming clear that Ukraine's top military leadership and their level of organization has declined greatly as of late. This is very unfortunate. Multiple AFU soldiers and officers have stated that they currently do have the manpower and equipment necessary to hold back the current Russian onslaught. Or at the very least much more effectively slow the rate of advance. However the dismal state of army leadership, organization, and interaction between formations, has led to dire situations on multiple fronts. Yuriy Butusov has said the same, and your comments here seem to agree.
My main question is how much can these failures be blamed on Syrskyi and the team he installed? If these problems existed under Zaluzhny, then somehow we didn't hear about them nearly as much, and they had a much smaller impact on AFU's combat performance. That's not to say there were no issues under the old command, there were and many were not secret. But they didn't add up to such a comprehensive failure to learn and adapt that we see now at the General Staff.
I would also note that in addition to Syrskyi and the General Staff, the so-called "Supreme Commander-in-Chief" of the Ukrainian military also needs to be held to account for the current calamity. And not just for the petty, politically motivated firing of Zaluzhny. Also for his refusal to take any responsibility for the current problems. He'd rather blame everything all on the West, or individual commanders (preferably ones he didn't appoint of course). Also note that Bezuhla, widely seen as Yermak's (and therefore Zelensky's) attack dog, has been waging a PR/social media campaign to discredit Syrskyi, and place all blame for current losses on him and his staff. Seemingly without a hint of irony, or shame, given that she honed her technique on a similar smear campaign against Zaluzhny, which helped secure Syrskyi's promotion. The upshot is clear, Zelensky wants to ensure that the military alone takes the blame, while the President's Office maintains a level of support among the Ukrainian people, and Western journalists continue to praise the "Ukrainian Churchill."
The person at the top, political leadership in this case, is always responsible for the good and the bad that happens. If there is a problem then it is their responsibility to fix it. In the US civil war, Lincoln fired several generals until he found one that could lead the Union army to victory. Poor performance of the army was endangering his chances for reelection in 1864 and his main political rival was a general he had fired. Critical victories at Vicksburg and Gettysburg in July 1863 may have saved him and he promoted the commander of the Vicksburg victory to head the entire army. The election process was a method to hold Lincoln accountable.
In addition to the 1864 election, the US had elections during WW1 and WW2. During the Korean war, Eisenhower was elected with the promise to end the Korean war. During the unpopular Vietnam war, LBJ decided not to run for reelection and was replaced by Nixon, who spent years pulling out of the war. Elections hold leaders accountable, at least to a certain degree.
Ukraine doesn't have elections in time of war so its citizens don't have that tool of accountability available to them. If they did and they liked their president's performance, they could reelect him as they did so many times in the US. If not, they could replace him. Either way, elections would compel the president to constantly audition for his job, as he should in a democracy.
In the absence of such a tool, there is only the press and social media to communicate the desire of the population, even though it cannot compel a change. It would be nice if the president and parliament could identify military reforms it would like and replace any military leaders that fail to achieve those reforms. But the first item is to define the objectives. The second would be to hold leadership accountable.
It's a shame there is no such leverage on the political leadership, as well.
Thank you both for this: it is a comprehensive summary of your previous observations. It also makes clear the structural weaknesses of Ukraine and a potential non American Western force.
Given the old Warsaw Pact seemed to have operated Division and Corps structures, why do you think these disciplines have been forgotten? (Is it that they’ve withered away whilst small wars have been predominant?)
If anyone has any questions or something to add, I'd be happy to hear them.
Well, there’s not much to say, you’ve outlined an over-arching issue then filled in the dots for us beautifully, confirmed some sad suspicions that many have been lost or injured through disorganisation, rather than inevitable losses to enemy action.
Hopefully, the call for accountability will increase and action will be taken.
It's becoming clear that Ukraine's top military leadership and their level of organization has declined greatly as of late. This is very unfortunate. Multiple AFU soldiers and officers have stated that they currently do have the manpower and equipment necessary to hold back the current Russian onslaught. Or at the very least much more effectively slow the rate of advance. However the dismal state of army leadership, organization, and interaction between formations, has led to dire situations on multiple fronts. Yuriy Butusov has said the same, and your comments here seem to agree.
My main question is how much can these failures be blamed on Syrskyi and the team he installed? If these problems existed under Zaluzhny, then somehow we didn't hear about them nearly as much, and they had a much smaller impact on AFU's combat performance. That's not to say there were no issues under the old command, there were and many were not secret. But they didn't add up to such a comprehensive failure to learn and adapt that we see now at the General Staff.
I would also note that in addition to Syrskyi and the General Staff, the so-called "Supreme Commander-in-Chief" of the Ukrainian military also needs to be held to account for the current calamity. And not just for the petty, politically motivated firing of Zaluzhny. Also for his refusal to take any responsibility for the current problems. He'd rather blame everything all on the West, or individual commanders (preferably ones he didn't appoint of course). Also note that Bezuhla, widely seen as Yermak's (and therefore Zelensky's) attack dog, has been waging a PR/social media campaign to discredit Syrskyi, and place all blame for current losses on him and his staff. Seemingly without a hint of irony, or shame, given that she honed her technique on a similar smear campaign against Zaluzhny, which helped secure Syrskyi's promotion. The upshot is clear, Zelensky wants to ensure that the military alone takes the blame, while the President's Office maintains a level of support among the Ukrainian people, and Western journalists continue to praise the "Ukrainian Churchill."
The person at the top, political leadership in this case, is always responsible for the good and the bad that happens. If there is a problem then it is their responsibility to fix it. In the US civil war, Lincoln fired several generals until he found one that could lead the Union army to victory. Poor performance of the army was endangering his chances for reelection in 1864 and his main political rival was a general he had fired. Critical victories at Vicksburg and Gettysburg in July 1863 may have saved him and he promoted the commander of the Vicksburg victory to head the entire army. The election process was a method to hold Lincoln accountable.
In addition to the 1864 election, the US had elections during WW1 and WW2. During the Korean war, Eisenhower was elected with the promise to end the Korean war. During the unpopular Vietnam war, LBJ decided not to run for reelection and was replaced by Nixon, who spent years pulling out of the war. Elections hold leaders accountable, at least to a certain degree.
Ukraine doesn't have elections in time of war so its citizens don't have that tool of accountability available to them. If they did and they liked their president's performance, they could reelect him as they did so many times in the US. If not, they could replace him. Either way, elections would compel the president to constantly audition for his job, as he should in a democracy.
In the absence of such a tool, there is only the press and social media to communicate the desire of the population, even though it cannot compel a change. It would be nice if the president and parliament could identify military reforms it would like and replace any military leaders that fail to achieve those reforms. But the first item is to define the objectives. The second would be to hold leadership accountable.
It's a shame there is no such leverage on the political leadership, as well.
Thank you both for this: it is a comprehensive summary of your previous observations. It also makes clear the structural weaknesses of Ukraine and a potential non American Western force.
Given the old Warsaw Pact seemed to have operated Division and Corps structures, why do you think these disciplines have been forgotten? (Is it that they’ve withered away whilst small wars have been predominant?)
Great work, as ever.