Hello everybody!
It was… sigh… yes, an ‘exciting’ week in Ukraine. And tragic, too.
…between others, because Syrsky & Buddies are continuing their successful extermination of skilled ZSU officers and other ranks, while fantastically establishing ever more machine-gun-equipped anti-aircraft units…
…to counter Russian attack UAVs, your know, and although knowing very well, these are entirely pointless…
Or, how about the newest example: say, a Russian missile strike on a training camp in the Kherson Oblast, killing and wounding who-knows-how many troops bunched together…?
Scenes of this kind are meanwhile churning my insides out…
When this happened under Drapaty’s command - two times - he resigned (although it was not his fault; it was Syrsky who was intriguing to subvert his authority). Now it’s ‘happening’ again, and nobody is going to resign. Because Syrsky & Buddies know better…
And, with this happening again, and again, and again, and again, and again… please tell me - especially all those complaining ‘I’ve abandoned Ukraine’, not to talk about those ‘furious’ I’m critical of Israel (and thus an ‘anti-Semite’): what shall I analyse in this war? Count ‘Hero Zelensky’s’ mistakes? Yermak’s mistakes? Count Syrsky’s mistakes? Count all the incompetent buddies appointed by Syrsky? All of their mistakes? Count all the battles lost because of them? All the villages and towns irrecoverably ruined because of them?
…count the Ukrainian troops and civilians killed or wounded because of them…?
Again: I’m so fed up of this, I prefer to limit myself to supporting our collection for the ZSU (see: Rickshaws for the ZSU). This is presently the only thing making sense (and it’s neither helping Zele, Yermak, nor Syrsky, although the latter is near-certain to claim even this as ‘his win’).
Thus, I’m handing over to (a much more) patient Don, where… ugh… even Don can’t stand this any more…
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Ukrainian Command Issues
Drapaty said that when he became the Commander of the Ground Forces the army was mired in managerial stagnation. There was fear, lack of initiative and detachment on the frontline units. There was systemic abuse, personnel decisions based on connections and low internal organization. He tried to shift the army from a culture of fear to a culture of responsibility. In removing half of the Ground Forces leadership, he focused on decentralization, accountability and professionalism. Decisions were made on the basis of analysis, results, and respect for subordinates, not on status or loyalty. He also made an effort to eliminate corruption and increase transparency in mobilization.
In frustration, he resigned, saying “I was unable to make people follow my orders. I didn’t push hard enough or change attitudes toward discipline. This is my responsibility.”
The final straw that lead to his resignation was yet another missile strike on a Ukrainian training base. If he hoped his resignation would be a wake up call, if failed. Yet another Ukrainian training base was hit with a missile and it killed and wounded more soldiers.
Many talented officers refuse promotions above the brigade level because of the politics on the General Staff level. Drapaty now commands the Joint Forces, focusing entirely on combat operations, operations that are still micromanaged by Syrsky.
Zelensky appointed Hennadiy Shapovalov as the new Commander of the Ground Forces. From 2019 to 2021, he had been commander of the 59th Brigade. In March 2022 he was promoted to Brigadier General and served in the positions of the head of the Military Cooperation of the Armed Forces in Ukraine, a member Commission on the Coordination of Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine, and became the commander of the forces of the Operational Command South in April 2024. In February 2025 he became the liaison at the NATO military aid coordination center in Germany until becoming the number two man under Syrsky.
“Changes are needed and this is an imperative,” he said.
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The formation of corps is quietly…slowly… ‘progressing’…
The three Operational Strategic Groupings (OSUV) will remain. Each had 3-6 Operational Tactical Groupings (OTU) and they had 3-22 brigades and several battalions each. 22 brigades are simply too many for any command organization to effectively manage and support. The OTU’s will be replaced by corps that will have 4-6 brigades each. The OSUV might have 5-15 corps and hopefully an operational reserve to aid any sector that is being threatened by Russian attacks.
It is difficult to restructure organizations in the middle of combat. Some brigades have to be moved and there’s always a vulnerability when changing units in a defensive position, even if it’s a regular rotation of personnel within the unit. And then there is the fact that Syrsky constantly detached battalions from brigades in one sector and sent them to another sector as reinforcements. Reuniting detached battalions with the brigades is an additional level of complexity.
Syrsky said that “several” corps-level commands have been created and have received their brigades and support units. They’ve been assigned their sectors of responsibility and the corps has, in turn, assigned sectors of responsibility to the brigades and coordinated with the units to their left and right. The corps commanders are responsible for the selection of their own staff.
Syrsky said that the transition to a corps-based organizational structure should be complete by the end of 2025. Obviously, it takes him time to select ‘the right one’ between his buddies for every single position.
And, he’s in no hurry.
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Kursk/Sumy
The 225th Regiment counter attacked and seized the village of Andriivka. In the process they killed a Russian battalion commander. Ukraine is now advancing on Yunakivka. Russia drops eight bombs on Khotin.
North Korea is sending 5,000 construction workers and 1,000 combat engineers to Kursk. They will remove mines and repair roads, buildings, and electrical and communication lines. 15,000 North Korean workers are already in Russia. Moscow is transferring technology and sending sculptors and architects to North Korea to build memorials for the North Korean dead in Kursk.
12 km north of Tyotkino and 3 km from the border, Ukraine said they dropped four bombs on houses in Alekseyevka that were used for drone operations. They also bombed Tyotkino itself.
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Vovchansk
A soldier from the 57th Brigade talks about his experiences in the ruins of Vovchansk, where sometimes the Russians run to him and all he tries to do is wound them so the drones can finish them off, and sometimes the Russians are just across the road from him. At night, he stays awake, listens to the radio and thinks about his family.
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Kupiansk
Kupiansk is hit by a nighttime airstrike. Russia advances 2 km out of Dvorichna to the woods and are met by Ukrainian drones.
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Terny
A Russian assault was launched on quad bikes that they bought with their own money. There was a driver and passenger on each bike and they were supposed to travel to one treeline before dismounting and attacking Ukrainian positions. They were attacked by drones and four survivors took shelter in a dugout. Ukrainian drones dropped bombs on them so they decided to leave. A lone Ukrainian defender decided it was better to take the initiative so he advanced against them, firing his weapon. Low on ammo, he threw a grenade, which wounded one of them in the heel. Upon hearing the moaning, the Ukrainian soldier told the Russians that they were outnumbered and the Russians agreed to surrender.
Just outside of Makiivka, Russia bombards a village with thermobaric rockets.
South of Terny, a Ukrainian is observed moving and that is enough to justify an airstrike.
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Siversk
Another Russian assault towards Hryhorivka is attacked by artillery and drones. Some Russians move into well concealed positions, but they were seen moving into those positions.
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Chasiv Yar
Yet more thermobaric rockets on Ukrainian positions just outside Chasiv Yar.
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Toretsk
A Russian attack towards Yablunivka was met by ATGMs, artillery and drones and resulted in the loss of 14 armored vehicles, six motorized vehicles and 50 men. Russian drones attack Ukrainians in Oleksandro-Kalynove. The outskirts of Kostiantynivka are hit by Russian airstrikes. All the roads leading into the town are already being intercepted by drones.
The 36th Marines destroyed ten pieces of Russian artillery in the last seven days.
This firefight happened in May as the Russians approached Romanivka. The Russians eventually took the village a couple of weeks ago.
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Pokrovsk
It was nine weeks ago when the Russians overran Tarasivka. Since then, they’ve been slowly encircling Pokrovsk and Kostiantynivka to the north. A Russian assault towards Uspenivka failed.
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Komar
The establishment and organisation of the XX Corps ZSU, and the composition of its primary elements, have been identified. Four of the units were in the Komar sector and the 17th Brigade was moved from Pokrovsk.
Recently, there have been several deep and narrow penetrations around Komar which indicate an unstable front. The specific reasons for the repeated instability are unknown. Maybe several smaller units across the front briefly collapsed. Maybe there were gaps between adjacent units due to poor coordination and Russia moved into these gaps. Maybe there were a lot of units being shuffled around to create a corps and this movement and reorganization created the instability. There isn’t enough information to confidently determine the cause.
The 33rd, 23rd, 141st and 31st have been in their same relative positions for several months now, but there have been a dozen other brigades, regiments and battalions moving in and out of the front between the village of Zaporizhzhia and Shevchenko in that same amount of time. That’s a lot of movement and that creates a lot of instability. Untangling the units after three years of patchwork defenses was never going to be easy. Maybe this instability is the unavoidable cost of creating a more effective organizational structure that will increase the strength and capability of the Ukrainian army. Time will tell.
On the way to the village of Zaporizhzhia, the Russians heavily bombarded Ukrainian positions, more than what is seen in the video, and Ukraine abandoned two MRAPs.
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Zaporizhzhia
Russian cluster munitions bombard Mala Tokmachka. Treelines outside of Myrne were shelled. Russia was unable to advance in this sector.
In June 2023, the only rail line to connect Donetsk with Crimea over land was only five km behind the front lines. It could not be used because it was within distance of Ukrainian artillery fire so that month they began to build an 80 km rail line that would bypass the interdicted line that was so close to the front. It was completed in May 2024 and was initially 50 km from the front line.
In July 2023 Russia began to line the interdicted railroad with railway cars to form a barrier against any Ukrainian advance in this sector. When they stopped in February 2024 they had used 2,000 railway cars to create a 30 km barrier.
Russia also built another rail line along the coast of the Azov Sea. It’s 80-100 km from the front lines, making it impossible to interdict with conventional artillery and harder to interdict with drones and missiles.
On 14 December 2024, Ukrainian Special Operations Forces sabotaged the tracks 40 km south of the front lines. When the train came to a halt, drones and missiles from HIMARS attacked it. 40 fuel tankers and a locomotive were destroyed. On 24 May, a Russian train was hit by drones 50 km south of the front lines. At least three fuel tankers were destroyed. On 21 June, another train carrying oil was hit 35 km from the front lines and at least 11 fuel tankers were burning. The Russian army has 25,000 soldiers dedicated to building and repairing damaged tracks so clearing the damaged cars and repairing the tracks could be completed in a few days. But as drone operations continue to improve it is likely these attacks will continue to increase.
Some of the factors to consider in the operation is that the Russian trains move about 40 kph, there are few routes for the train to take and it could have been under observation for hours, by aerial units and/or personnel on the ground. Rotor aircraft have limited battery life and bigger drones could carry smaller drones to extend the range of the smaller drones. It is important to time the arrival of the train with the arrival of the drones because of the limited battery life of drones and the 15-30 minutes it might take for the drones to travel. Russian electronic warfare assets have to be considered in planning, as well.
A lot has changed since 2023 and it will continue to change. It is about 100 km from the front lines to the Sea of Azov. If Ukraine can regularly interdict the rail lines in the occupied territories with rotor or winged drones then the importance of the Kerch bridge increases.
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The Russian Ecocide of Ukraine
It’s been two years since Russia destroyed the Kakhovka dam and drained the reservoir. Some of the reservoir land is being reclaimed by plants and animals. Other sections remain open and sandy. Up to 6.9 million hectares of farmland have been abandoned due to lack of water.
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Playfra geolocated all the trenches, barbed wire, dragon’s teeth and small positions created by Ukraine and Russia in a sector of map centered on Robotyne. Here’s the link for the interactive map. Once the Russians reached the front lines in front of Orkhiv the front never changed by more than 7 km and were stable by August 2022. The Ukrainian offensive started in June 2023 and lasted until October 2023.
On the map below, Ukraine occupied the blue at the beginning of the offensive. After heavy casualties on both sides, Ukraine advanced on an 11 km front no more than 8 km.
For a wider perspective, 8 km was about one third of the depth of prepared Russian defenses. Ukraine was able to partially penetrate the first Surovikin line west of Verbove. Being further away, the second line is more complete and better constructed. In between was an intermediate line and hundreds of smaller positions in treelines/hedgerows designed to delay and attrit Ukrainian forces.
More than any other obstacle, the minefields in front of these positions were the most deadly for Ukrainian forces. But an obstacle that is not covered by enemy fire is not an obstacle. Trenches kept the Russians alive for a little while longer, allowing them to cover the mines with fire. Ukrainian sappers would have to remove the mines in the open fields, at night, and under fire from small arms and artillery. The casualty rate among Ukrainian infantry, especially sappers, was high.
More important than the Ukrainian casualty rate, it slowed the Ukrainian advance. This meant that when the Russian infantry in the defensive lines were eliminated, reserves could be rushed up to take their place before Ukraine could exploit the breach in the defenses they created. Even with all the command issues in the Ukrainian army, if the Russians did not have these extensive defenses with massive minefields, there was a high chance Ukraine could have broken through.
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Kherson
A Russian column was hit by at least one mine dropped by a drone. Details about the rest of the damage is unknown.
With the lights on at night, you might presume the Russians were on a safe part of the Dnieper river but that doesn’t explain the rifle fire halfway through the video. It is not surprising that inexperienced personnel don’t know how to handle small craft with engines. It is surprising that the results would be posted.
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Occupied Territories
A Ukrainian collaborator became the acting mayor of Berdyansk. In that capacity, he arrested and tortured pro-Ukrainian citizens. He was shot last week.
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Making a Russian van drone proof
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Russia
The Shipunov Desin Bureau in Tula has 8,000 workers. It conducts research and production of precision weapon systems, such as the Pantsir air defense system. Five drones damaged an electrical substation, three warehouses and an administrative building, starting a 400 square meter fire. Two days later, another drone hit a warehouse of finished products and operations were suspended.
The Russia Africa Corps is supporting the junta in Mali. Another convoy of Russian and Mali government soldiers was ambushed. Four Russians were killed and three were injured. A different junta convoy was attacked with a drone.
The A-22 Foxbat light aircraft has been used to attack the Alabuga drone factory before. Some reports said that the aircraft carried a bomb in the most recent attack, but that would detract from carrying its own payload on its one-way mission. A video report shows that a drone was towing a glider. The lift of the glider means the A-22 only had to contend with the drag of the glider and could carry its own explosives to hit the same or different target. Three videos of the attack and a recruiting video promising technology jobs for foreign students are here. One person was killed, 13 were wounded and a fire was quickly extinguished. The plant is expected to produce about 9,000 combat drones and 15,000 decoy drones this year.
An S-400 was reportedly destroyed in Bryansk with a Storm Shadow missile.
In addition to the workers being sent to Kursk, North Korea is sending 25,000 workers to the Alabuga drone factory. This helps Russia, which is short of laborers, and trains North Koreans on the production and operation of drones. New facilities were built to accommodate the workers. Russia has already helped North Korea increase the accuracy of their KN-23 ballistic missile and has given them technical assistance with their air-to-air missiles, nuclear subs and missile-launch capabilities.
Russia recruited between 140-180,000 prisoners to fight in Ukraine. It plans to recruit 126,000 more in 2025. Russia had 420k prisoners in 2022. That was reduced to 266k in October 2023.
The Front Eagle tanker collided with the Russian shadow fleet tanker Adalynn in the strait of Hormuz. The Adalynn caught fire and its 24 crew members were evacuated. A fire on the Front Eagle was quickly extinguished. Described as a navigational error, the Front Eagle seemed to be overtaking the Adalynn when the Adalynn turned towards the Front Eagle. The Front Eagle didn’t notice the change until late but instead of turning away from the Adalynn it turned towards the ship.
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Ukraine
The new commander of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces has prioritized Russian drone operators over soldiers, tanks, logistics or any other target. He is trying to achieve air superiority.
440 drones and 32 missiles were sent in one attack and 28 people were killed and 100 wounded throughout the country. The soundtrack of a drone attack in Odesa. A drone flies into high-rise apartments in Kyiv.
Russia used cluster munitions in Kharkiv in 2022 many times, as seen by this debris pile. Using Kh-101 missiles, they delivered them in Kyiv last week, as seen here. Whereas US cluster munitions had a failure rate of 2-3%, Russian cluster munitions can have a failure rate of up to 40%, providing a greater chance of long term hazard.
Russia expanded its attacks on energy production by using drones to attack wind turbines in the Mykolaiv region.
Ukraine claims a 40% effectives rate for machine guns firing at drones even though they are flying at 2000 meters before diving down on their targets. Ukraine also uses helicopters to hunt Shaheds.
A 33-year-old mobilized soldier that left pro-Russian comments in chatbots operated by Russia was recruited to provide the location of his unit’s Neptune coastal defense missile systems. He was also asked to adjust Russian missile strikes on military training centers and would be given advanced warning of strikes so he could evacuate. He was arrested while preparing an intelligence report before he could send it.
8300 Ukrainian convicts joined the Ukrainian army and another 1,000 applicants are under review. Officials estimate that 20-30% of the country’s inmates could potentially join the armed forces.
Since Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi was appointed commander of the Unmanned Systems Forces, he promoted Junior Lieutenant Andriy Klymenko to command the 414th “Magyar Birds” Separate Brigade. Brovdi plans to promote 6-7 drone units and create a unified command and online reporting system, as well as creating an efficient logistical system for ammo and critical components.
An unspecified number of Ukrainian prisoners were returned. All were severely ill or wounded. Some had been prisoners for over three years and many surrendered at Mariupol.
A repurposed Shahed drone engine.
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Diplomacy
26% of the world’s oil supply moves through the Strait of Homuz. With Trump widening the war on Iran, the price of oil will rise even more.
Lindsey Graham is making another effort to bring the Russian sanctions bill to a vote in the senate.
A year ago, children of Russian spies thought their family was Argentinian that moved to Slovenia. They only discovered they were Russian on the plane to Moscow after their parents and other Russian spies were arrested in multiple countries and exchanged for US and German hostages and Russian political prisoners. The children spoke only Spanish. Last week, Argentina arrested a group of Russians that were part of Prigozhin’s disinformation campaign and were working with local collaborators. Argentina is creating the Federal Investigation Department, similar to the US’s FBI, that will focus on organized crime, drug trafficking and terrorism.
Latvia is creating a Rangers unit capable of reconnaissance, direct action, unconventional warfare, national resistance support and asymmetric tactics.
Sweden is borrowing $31 billion to increase defense spending to 3.5% GDP by 2032. Germany recently changed their rules so they could increase their debt for spending on defense.
Hungary sold 75% of the state defense holding company to a private company allied with Orban.
A US band that tours performs with a Ukrainian flag, except in Hungary where it’s not allowed. So in Hungary they use blue and yellow lighting.
Russian and Belarusian citizens cannot buy real estate in Latvia and must have security clearances to work on critical infrastructure there. Lithuania and Finland already have a real estate ban in place. Latvia joined seven Nordic and Baltic countries that prohibit any Russians who fought Ukraine from entering the Schengen Area.
Sometime before 2022, the Slovakian government sold obsolete ammunition to Konstrukta, a state-owned defense company. On the second day of Russia’s open invasion, the government bought the ammo back from the state-owned company for a higher price than they sold it and sent it to Ukraine. Fico subsequently became the leader of Slovakia and his government arrested eight people for this action. The European Public Prosecutor’s Office is investigating. An opposition leader says it is a politically motivated prosecution. The current defense minister has accused the former defense minister of treason for sending 13 decommissioned MiG-29 fighters to Ukraine. Fico is talking about pulling out of NATO and becoming neutral. Fico refused to send surplus government equipment to Ukraine but Slovakian commercial companies still deliver equipment and ammunition.
Czechia bought 246 CV90s and will produce 40% of the work, including chassis and turrets. Production is expected to be completed by 2030.
The EU is spending €75 billion to upgrade transportation infrastructure to move military equipment. Much of the infrastructure will also provide economic benefits but diverse shipping companies are already ‘concerned’ that restructuring ports might reduce some of their economic benefits.
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Equipment
A closer look at the modular homes that were used to launch drones during Spiderweb.
After six months of construction, the UK opened a new factory to produce M777 towed howitzer. A UK design, the M777 production in that country was shut down in 2013 and continued in the US. Towed artillery is cheaper to make than self-propelled artillery and it is smaller and easier to hide on the battlefield dominated by drones.
North Korea builds its own computer numerical control machines which it then uses to build military equipment, among other things. It is building a new factory that will be at least twice the size of the existing machine production site. This will increase its capacity to build military equipment and they will likely export these machines to Russia, as well. North Korea provides a sanctuary for weapon production used by Russia.
The Czech government expects to deliver 1.8 million 155mm and 122mm rounds with funds from frozen Russian assets and 11 countries. They plan to continue the program in 2026 but that depends on allied funding and the October election results. Increasing defense spending from 2 to 3% of their GDP is also dependent on the elections. Russia currently uses twice as many artillery rounds as Ukraine does.
The new Russian reconnaissance V2U drone was recently shot down for the first time near Toretsk. It uses a Chinese microcomputer, a US central processor, a Russian router and a Ukrainian mobile operator SIM card. There is only one GPS module but because of jamming it relies on Ukrainian networks to navigate. There are other components from Japan, Ireland, Switzerland and the US.
Both Russian and Ukrainian drones now use civilian communication signals to navigate. Because of this, Russia shuts down cell towers in regions where Ukrainian drones are operating. This is an effective short-term tactic but a Ukrainian EW expert believes that mobile communication equipment are effective sensors that can detect drones and other aircraft by their signal characteristics. He believes that the network can be turned into a passive radar tool with spectrum analysis and source direction determination that could detect small targets in the silent mode. In addition, the network can control its modulation and interference that would disorient drones that use it for navigation. Regarding the video feeds from drones, he says they only send information back to Russia and while the drone operators are developing the capability to fly Shaheds remotely, they do not have that capability yet. Also, no one has autonomous AI, but they are using fragments of it to perform certain tasks.
Ukraine’s Lima EW system is more effective than Russian or Western alternatives to disrupting guided aerial bombs. But EW is constantly changing and it is possible that at some point in the future the Russians will find an alternative to the Lima system. France is hosting NATO efforts to counter guided bombs and the Ukrainian delegation said they might deploy these systems by the end of 2025. In areas where the Lima system is deployed, it can take as many as 16 bombs to hit a target. One of the technologies being researched is a drone that is capable of detecting and targeting a bomb in the air. The speed of the bombs when released can range from 550-1,900 kph and slows down from drag.
In combat, you have to detect a target and then have the capability to attack the target. In May 2023, Ukraine received the first of 13 tactical radars. In the summer of 2024, Ukraine had a drone capable of flying at high altitudes and ram enemy reconnaissance drones. The radars provide the exact location of the recon drones and the interceptor drones engage them. The problem was, there weren’t enough tactical radars and the Russians would sometimes find and destroy them. Ukraine started building tactical radars that were cheaper, easier to use, and less powerful so they could still detect reconnaissance drones but their weaker signal would make it harder for the Russians to detect them. They can’t produce them fast enough and the wait list increased from a six-month delay to a 13-month delay. New drone interceptor units still need to be trained on the use of the radars. There are very few training centers and when experienced interceptor units train new units then they aren’t hunting Russian drones.
An estimate that Russia built 60-70 T-90s in 2022, 140-180 in 2023, and 250-300 in 2024.
One Russian fiber optic drone has backup radio and video control if the cable breaks or runs out.
Poroshenko sent 57 cargo and 35 utility ATVs to the army that are valued at $715k.
The French AASM Hammer has a rocket engine and a gliding range of about 70 km. The new AASM Hammer XLR has a turbojet engine and a range of 150-200 km, depending on the release height.
Aerial and Ground Launched Small Diameter Bombs
The GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb (SDB) is a 110 kg precision-guided glide bomb that has been in service since 2006 and uses an inertial navigation system aided by GPS. Over 17,000 have been produced. They can only hit stationary targets. They have a 16 kg high explosive warhead that can be set for air burst for targets in the open and delayed detonation to penetrate targets of up to one meter of steel reinforced concrete buried under one meter of dirt. It has a 110 km range and costs $40,000 to make.
Its successor is the GBU-53B SDB II, which is the same bomb but uses inertial navigation and GPS to reach the general vicinity of the target. Course corrections can be provided over a UHF bandwidth from any sensor using the Link 16 data system. It then switches to target acquisition mode that combines millimeter-wave radar, infrared homing and semi-active laser homing. Combining these three sensors, it can classify and prioritize a range of targets in a semi-autonomous mode. It has a shaped-charge warhead with both blast and fragmentation effects. It has a 110 km range against stationary targets, a 74 km range against moving targets and cost $200,000 to make. This weapon has not been provided to Ukraine and was first used in Yemen where an intact bomb was recovered by the Houthis, who have relations with both Russia and China.
The M26 rocket fired cluster munitions out of the HIMARS and MLRS vehicles. Although the US did not sign the agreement to ban cluster munitions they decided to decommission thousands of M26 rockets. In 2006 they stopped paying for the destruction of the rocket engines and decided to combine the thousands of rocket engines with the thousands of GBU-39s and create the Ground Launched Small Diameter Bomb (GLSDB) with Saab and Boeing teaming up on the project. It is launched from HIMARS and MLRS and could glide in non-ballistic paths around terrain that might otherwise mask the target.
With much fanfare and delay, the US bought an undisclosed number of GLSDB’s for Ukraine as a less expensive alternative to ATACMS (which cost over $1 million) and they started to arrive at the beginning of 2024. There were immediate problems with the rocket booster failing to separate correctly when the bomb went into glide mode and Russian jamming reduced its accuracy from one meter or less, to as far as 50 meters away. This was occuring for all weapons relying on GPS for accuracy and the further these 16 kg warheads exploded from the target, the less likely they were able to do any damage.
Ukraine was also using SDB’s in aerial attacks, and while SDB’s also relied on GPS-assists to their inertial navigation the jamming had a much reduced effect on them. The reason is because of Russian air defenses, Ukrainian aircraft have to fly at low altitudes and quickly climb to only 600 meters before releasing the bomb, giving it a maximum glide path of only 30 km instead of 110 km when dropped at higher altitudes. The degree of error when relying solely on inertial navigation is much smaller at 30 km than at 110 km and the aerial launched SDB can still hit a building at the much smaller ranges even if jammed.
Because of the early and widespread failures of the GLSDB its use was quickly discontinued. After a year, SAAB/Boeing reported that they resolved the rocket separation and jamming issues and successfully tested 19 of them. The US already shipped some of the GLSDBs to Europe and they will be redeployed into Ukraine soon. Since this was bought with funds approved during the Biden administration it is not new US aid for Ukraine, simply the resumption of delivery of previously committed aid.
The M26 rocket motors are no longer being produced. SAAB’s confidence in the future of the GLSDB is high enough to pay for new rockets engines for future GLSDB production.
In the post-Soviet defense industry consolidation there were only two companies that could produce solid rocket engines in the US, which is a crucial bottleneck for many US weapon systems. The funding is increasing enough to expand the number of companies that can produce those engines.
Thanks Don (&Tom)! How do you see the current drone (and probable few missiles) air campaign on dual-use facilities in Russia? Before it was easy: if you hit an oil tank, it burns - photos all over SNS; long term results more difficult to judge. How about now? Are the strikes successful in least in the sense to keep some Russian facilities under pressure?